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Soviet Legal Approach to Space Law
Issues at the United Nations
The advent and increase of national activity in outer space
provides the international lawyer with an opportunity for choice:
he or she may develop a new branch of international law with its
own unique set of legal concepts, or may rely on an extension of
the classic international law precepts in the new area. The Soviet
international jurist has opted for the former. Activities of States in
outer space and the need to regulate those activities through the
creation of a legal order have provided the Soviet Union with an
ideal opportunity to pursue its international legal theory, and to
have these novel views readily accepted by the international com-
munity. Among the factors exploited by the Soviets and responsi-
ble for their successful inroads are: the absence of an established
legal regime in outer space; the lack of precedent in the form of
custom and practice of States; the general lack of familiarity with,
and knowledge of, outer space; the potential for great good and
great harm that can result from space activities; and the small
number of participating States directly involved in outer space
activities.
Soviet methods of achieving legal regimentation of outer space
activities will be explored, from the Sputnik era to the recent
Soyuz launchings. Despite the brevity of this period a number of
conventions have been proposed, completed, and ratified, which at-
test to the accelerated pace with which the world community is
addressing this sphere of international law. Soviet theorists are
vigorously involved in shaping this field of international law.
This particular area of the law is significantly intertwined with
the technological developments and political attitudes of States.
This note necessarily will digress from a purely legal analysis and
will discuss the underlying motivation of Soviet space law policy.
Technology will often shape the law and the political superstruc-
ture and ideology will influence the logic of the proposal. This
combination of the legal implications of space activities and the
absence of existing international legal theory provides a good op-
portunity for study of Soviet goals and attitudes toward inter-
national relations.
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Study of the Soviet attitude alone would serve little function
due to the general lack of knowledge and experience in the area of
space law. The United States' position, therefore, will be used to
provide needed perspective to the Soviet view or proposal. The So-
viet positions will be gleaned not only from official declarations but
also from jurists' comments. The substantive developments of
space law, in fact, can be seen as a dialectic between these two
space powers.
SOVIET APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Soviet jurists primarily look to two sources of interna-
tional law: treaties, conventions, and other international agree-
ments; and custom. It is not likely that any Soviet writer would
maintain that custom is the equal of treaty-based law. The Soviet
view, succinctly stated, is that "[n]eglect of international treaty
law and an exaggeration of the importance of international custom
is characteristic of many bourgeois jurists."1 Due to its compara-
tively late emergence on the international scene, the Soviet Union
has been unable to participate in the making of a substantial vol-
ume of the customary rules of international law. This distrust of
custom and its binding effect on the U.S.S.R. is pervasive in the
notion that custom gave the capitalist countries a legal basis for
exploitation.2
Now, however, the Soviets have begun a shift in that stance,
particularly as applied to space law. The Soviet writers have ac-
knowledged the role of custom in shaping space law. Problems
with earlier custom-based law remain, but the theorists seek to
avoid those constraints. The inapplicability of customary rules
generally is divorced from space law, the rationale being that they
arose in connection with earthbound activities. In the extraterres-
trial area the conditions are so different from the conditions under
which the customs were created that they prevent any valid appli-
cation.' Custom can now be recognized as a source of law accepted
by the Soviets, arguably because in this field it can play a major
role in the formation of these customs.
The United States' position on the role of custom is markedly
1. J. KOROVIN, S. KRYLOV, F. KOZHEVNIKOV, S. MOLODSTON, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed.
1957).
2. INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 76 (A. Piradov ed. 1976).
3. Id. at 75.
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dissimilar: "Custom is potentially the most important source of law
with regard to space activities."' The U.S. in most of its proposals
sought to implement the Statute of the International Court of Jus-
tice in order to use custom as a source for space law through Arti-
cle 38 of that statute.5 In light of the failure of many countries to
adopt the Soviet distinction between earth and space custom, the
Soviets relegated custom to the role of a secondary reserve source
of future international space law.6
It is the treaty or convention which is considered by the Soviet
Union to be the primary source of space law. Written treaties
would set down logically interrelated rules, as opposed to a cus-
tom-based method of making law out of simple rules of behavior.
7
The Soviet delegate to the General Assembly of the United Na-
tions stated that the U.S.S.R. desired international conventions to
prevent the imposition of alien ways of life through the use of sci-
entific and technical achievements.8 Although they appear to be
attempting to restrict the practices of States holding contrary po-
litical beliefs, the Soviets say that they are in favor of ordered reg-
ulation, not restriction.0
The Soviets catagorize the treaties into two types. The first
establishes general rules and principles of mutual relations be-
tween States, and are widely recognized. An example is the Treaty
on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies.10 The second class consists of treaties containing concrete
and special rules that are valid exclusively in relation to limited
numbers of States. Treaties of the first kind have a more impor-
tant and significant place in the system of international law and,
consequently, among its sources.11
The Soviet approach to space law is centered around the crea-
4. A. HALEY, Legal Problems of a Manned Lunar International Laboratory, in PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 71 (A. Haley, M.
Schwartz eds. 1964).
5. "The Court... shall apply. . . international custom as evidence of a general prac-
tice accepted as law." Statute of the I.C.J. Article 38(1)b.
6. INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW, supra note 2, at 77.
7. Id. at 77.
8. 27 U.N. GAOR, C.1 (1870th mtg.) 21, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1870 (1970).
9. 27 U.N. GAOR, C.1 (1861st mtg.) 31, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1861 (1972).
" 10. G. A. Res. 2222, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 13-15, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
11. V.VASSILEVSKAYA, Scientific and Technical Agreements on Space, in PROCEEDINGS
OF THE TENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 157 (M. Schwartz ed. 1967).
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tion of a body of space law which can prove advantageous to Soviet
ideology. 2 In attempting to achieve this goal, the Soviets have
sought to conclude as many treaties as possible. 3 This course of
conduct does not result in regulations like those of a municipal
code; rather, the space law code is alternatively ambiguous and
concrete, and is concise only as to the most recognized and ac-
cepted doctrines.
The Soviets have gained confidence in their dealing with the
West at the negotiation table which has furthered their push for
international agreements. A major advantage that the Soviet
Union has when negotiating codes with the West is the stability of
its institutional make-up and the difficulty the United States has
in generating domestic support in order to present a unified
stance.14
One of the important considerations underlying the Soviet
treaty strategy is the overall Soviet view that pragmatic thinking
and practiced reason always prevail over strict international legal
theory: 5
"[T]he Soviets have adjusted their interpretation of international
law to suit their own needs. For the U.S.S.R., the legality of aero-
space activities has depended primarily on the nature and func-
tion of the activity as opposed to the general application of the
legal concept. In conducting their campaign of peaceful coexis-
tence the Soviets have sought to use international law to serve
their own needs ... "16
It is on the framework of the Soviet policy of peaceful coexis-
tence that their approach to space law is constructed. The Soviet
Union has placed its heaviest emphasis on the ban of nuclear
weapons as a justification for the Space Treaty.1 7 The fear of nu-
clear destruction is the principal factor underlying the develop-
12. 26 U.N. GAOR, C.1 (1820th mtg.) 4, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1820 (1971).
13. G. ZHUKOV, Basic Stages and Immediate Prospects of the Development of Outer
Space Law, in PROCEmNOS OF THE SEVENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 315
(A. Haley, M. Schwartz eds. 1964).
14. B. RAMUNDO, Moderator Law Professor Workshop Issue Series No. 1 Detente 2-3
(1977).
15. S. KucHmEov, Sovereignty and Sovereign Rights in Outer Space, in PROCEEDINGS
OF THE FIFTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 17, (A. Haley ed. 1962).
16. J. MORENOF, Communications in Orbit: A Prognosis for World Peace, in PROCEED-
INGS OF THE NINTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 86-90 (M. Schwartz ed. 1966).
17. 21 U.N. GAOR, C.A (1492nd mtg.) 429, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/SR. 1492 (1966).
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ment of the peaceful coexistence policy.18 This is not the only simi-
larity lending credence to the notion that the Soviets have
extended their peaceful coexistence to space law. The Soviets con-
stantly refer to the peaceful cooperation of all States in the area of
space activities. The Soviet Union, however, is satisfied with one or
two state interactions.' As in peaceful coexistence, "[t]he struggle
of the two systems by peaceful means-economic, political, social,
ideological, technical, and cultural competition-continues and
must continue. Nothing can stop the class struggle."20 Clear evi-
dence of this competition in space activities is the duplication of
U.S. activities and identical parallel programs created by the
U.S.S.R.2" The amount of actual cooperation with the U.S., al-
though highly touted, is extremely limited in scope.22
Peaceful coexistence is an important concept to keep in mind
when reading the Soviet literature on space law, as it serves as a
reminder that legal theory takes a "back seat" to Soviet political
goals. The application of the doctrine belies the fact that no mat-
ter how different space is purported to be, international and earth-
oriented politics are unquestionably applied to space activities.
The U.S.S.R. attempts to legalize its ideologically-based strat-
agem in order to placate its opponents, as well as to fortify its in-
ternational pursuits. The Soviets have developed a formula of
space law. General principles of international law construct con-
temporary international law regardless of the field of application.
An example of this is the doctrine jus cogens as it applies to provi-
sions of Articles 53 and 64 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties of 1969.2a They are qualified as lex generalis. There are
also lex generalis in a specific branch of law that are lex specialis
in comparison to the general international law. Freedom of scien-
tific exploration in outer space as contained in Article One of the
Space Treaty is an example of a legal norm of space law that can-
not be contravened, but references to this principle cannot justify
18. B. RAMUNDO, PEACEFUL COEXISTNCE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE BUILDING OF COM-
MUNISM 113 (1967).
19. 22 U.N. GAOR, C.1 (1497th mtg.) 3, U.N. Doc. A/C.1I/PV. 1497 (1967).
20. PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE BUILDING OF COMMUNISM, supra
note 18.
21. Note the similarity of function of the Intelsate and Intersputnik organizations.
22. INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW, supra note 2, at 245-49.
23. Y. KOSOLOV, Interrelation Between Rules and Principles of International Outer
Space and General Rules and Principles of International Law, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIX-
TEENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF Otrra SPACE 45 (M. Schwartz ed. 1973).
1980]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Ann.
an intrusion into territorial spheres under the control of a sover-
eign state." The conceptualization of space law allows the Soviets
great freedom in their development of space law since they have
classified space law as a lex specialis and bar its application as a
part of international lex generalis until its acceptance in respect to
all other fields of international activities as a lex specialis.25
This theory allays the Soviet fear that space law is capable of
changing the face of international law with all its protections for
state sovereignty. The Soviet formula will be encountered through-
out the developments of space law.'
The Soviets desire that legal norms "keep pace with-and
sometimes keep ahead of-the preparation of technical program-
mes in any particular field.. . . , This goal, for all practical pur-
poses, is unachievable due to the speed with which technical
achievements are produced, the inability to create legal norms gov-
erning unknown future conduct, and the Soviet methodology in its
creation of space law through the laborious treaty process. That
process for obtaining a treaty on space progress is a series of step
maneuvers involving what appears to many as an endless repeti-
tion.2 8 In addition to the content, each step is charged with differ-
ing legal impacts: "General Assembly of the U.N. adopts a resolu-
tion, then a declaration and the States conclude international
agreements on this basis."" A clear example of this process in mo-
tion and its various legal effects is the evolution of the General
Assembly Resolution 1962 (XVIII), Legal Principles Governing Ac-
tivities of States in Exploration and Use of Outer Space, December
13, 1963.80 This resolution was then followed by a declaration re-
peating the same principles. Upon completion of the declaration,
the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. stated that they would undertake to re-
spect the principles enunciated in the draft declaration if it were
24. Id. at 46.
25. Id. at 47.
26. 26 U.N. GAOR, C.1, supra note 12, at 4.
27. Id.
28. M. JAFFE, Recent Developments in the International Law of Space, in PROCEED-
INGS OF THE SEVENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW ON OUTER SPACE 193 (A. Haley, M. Schwartz
eds. 1964).
29. G. ZHUKOV, Basic Stages and Immediate Prospects of the Development of Outer
Space Law, in PRoCEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 319
(A. Haley, M. Schwartz eds. 1964).
30. I. CsABApI, The U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Outer Space as Sources of
International Law, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER
SPACE 40 (A. Haley, M. Schwartz eds. 1965).
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unanimously accepted.' 1 According to Soviet jurists, this expres-
sion of acceptance of General Assembly Resolution (XVIII) is
binding as a rule of law since the fifth provision included language
that State activities "will be carried on in conformity with the
principles set forth. ' 82 Nonetheless, the Soviets proceeded to pur-
sue a more concrete obligation in the form of the Space Treaty.8 '
Soviet international theorists minimize the role of interna-
tional organizations in international law making, undermining the
legal significance of the General Assembly resolution and declara-
tion." International organizations cannot take the initiative of con-
cluding treaties on space law and are deemed only a mechanism of
cooperation and coordination of national efforts, since the treaties
are in the form of General Assembly resolutions. The resolutions
are necessarily sent directly to States for signature without diplo-
matic conferences. In other words, the United Nations does not,
strictly speaking, formulate rules of international law by its own
actions."5 By use of this procedure, the Soviet Union acts outside
the United Nations and negotiates settlements on its own. These
settlements often serve not only as bilateral agreements, but also
as multilateral ones in which smaller States are given a choice of
acceptance or no participation in an agreement at all. Those States
generally have no real influence on the final agreement."
Furthermore, the Soviets are vehemently opposed to entrust-
ing international organizations with the implementation or en-
forcement powers of the treaties if a State has reason to believe
that the "activity or experiment would cause potentially harmful
interference with the activities of other states. '
The U.S.S.R. is hostile to the concept that an international
organization can have the identical rights as a sovereign State and
31. U.N. GAOR, C.1 (1432nd mtg.) 159, 161, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/SR. 1342 (1963).
32. C. TUNKIN, QUESTIONS OF THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 124-37 (1962).
33. 19 U.N. GAOR, COMMrmE ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE (37th mtg.) 3,
7, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV. 37 (1965).
34. See, e.g., KAMENETSKAYA, The Role of International Organizations in the Forma-
tion of International Space Law, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTEENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE
LAW OF OUTER SPACE 42 (M. Schwartz ed. 1973).
35. Id. at 43.
36. 26 U.N. GAOR, C.1 (1820th mtg.) supra note 12, at 1. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
have made "secret pacts" and brought them to COPUOS for acceptance on an all-or-noth-
ing basis, in particular, the 1967 U.N. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return
of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space.
37. Legal Sub-Committee of the COPUOS, 22 U.N. GAOR (68th mtg. of the Sub-
comm.) 4, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.68 (1966).
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refuses to allow the International Court of Justice to exclusively
govern the States in their space activities."e
A. United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space (COPUOS)
What then is the role of the COPUOS in the Soviet approach
and, if it is used, why? The answers lie in the structure and meth-
odology of the COPUOS. The U.S.S.R. and the U.S. had two pro-
posals for creation of the COPUOS. Each differed significantly in
proposed membership. The ultimate agreement ended with an in-
creased membership of twenty-four.3 9 The U.S.S.R. used sweeping
language of peace and legal efficacy when it further proposed that
all decisions of the COPUOS be unanimous.40 To avoid creating a
sham committee (acting without participation of one of the space
powers), the U.S.S.R. proposal, and hence its participation, was ac-
cepted. The COPUOS consisted of two subcommittees: the Legal
Subcommittee, where international agreements on space are
drafted and submitted to the General Assembly for consideration,
and the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, whose concern
centers on applying space technology to the needs of Earth and the
problems encountered in space activities.
The COPUOS, however, is not a typical international organi-
zation. It was permitted under the General Assembly rules of com-
mittee procedure to adopt its own procedure. This was the justifi-
cation the Soviets used for requiring unanimous consent for any
decision leaving the committee.4 1 The Soviets stated that the
COPUOS should guide and direct all aspects of the activities of
the U.N. agencies which relate to the exploration and use of
space.
42
By virtue of the unanimous consent requirement, the Soviet
Union acquired a de facto veto power. It has accordingly sought to
empower an international organization which could (conceivably)
govern its activities. The arrangement appears to provide other
38. E. BROOKS, International Organization Aspects Affecting Space Law, in PROCEED-
INGS OF THE TENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OumR SPACE 174 (M. Schwartz ed. 1968).
39. 13 U.N. GAOR, C.1 (994th mtg.) 235, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/SR. 994 (1958).
40. 16 U.N. GAOR, C.1 (1212th mtg.) 257, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/SR. 1212 (1961).
41. "The General Assembly shall adopt its own rules of procedure." U.N. Charter Art.
21. "The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for
the performance of its functions." U.N. Charter Art. 22.
42. 26 U.N. GAOR, C.1, supra note 12, at 6.
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States with a veto as well, yet, once the U.S.S.R. and U.S. agree,
"there is a tendency to take the agreement of the other countries
for granted."43
In the Soviet view, COPUOS had an interesting role as an in-
ternational organization operating under the General Assembly
framework. The Soviets in fact desired that the committee have a
more nationalistic context, proffering power to the participating
States rather than operating under the General Assembly. An ex-
ample of this was the discussion of proposed amendments to a res-
olution in the first committee of the General Assembly. The propo-
sal, originally made by Cameroon and the United Arab Republic,
read:
[COPUOS] in consultation with the specialized agencies and in
cooperation with the Committee on Space Research, to prepare
and consider during its next session suggestions for programmes
of education and training of specialists in the peaceful uses of
outer space to assist the developing countries, and to report to
the General Assembly at its twenty-first session.
4
4
The U.S.S.R. supported an amendment that requested the
Secretary-General to prepare a program of education and training
in peaceful uses of outer space.'5 It was the Soviet view that such a
committee would reflect national views and would provide a safe-
guard against international organization interference in State se-
curity interests."' The U.S. attempted to bring an international
note in the particular area by not allowing for a decision of just a
few participating members of the CUPUOS. 4'
The Soviets viewed the committee as one that adopts uncon-
troversial texts by mutual agreement and defers issues tending to-
ward disagreement to a later date.48 The Soviets felt comfortable
43. W. HmAN, The Communication Satellite Corporation-The Beginning of a Com-
mercial Era in Space, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER
SPACE 183-199 (A. Haley, M. Schwartz eds. 1965).
44. 20 U.N. GAOR, 2 Annexes (Agenda Item 31) 6, U.N. Doc. A/6212 (1965). The Inter-
national Committee on Space Research (COSPAR), founded in 1958, consists of a number
of international scientific unions whose work centers on making recommendations to facili-
tate a coordinated approach to the implementation of these diverse technologies' application
to the field of space activities. COSPAR has been valuable in the area of informational
exchanges of scientific data and in the dissemination of prompt notification of launchings.
45. 20 U.N. GAOR, C.1 (1422nd mtg.) 429, 430, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/SR. 1422 (1965).
46. Id.
47. 20 U.N. GAOR, II Annexes (Agenda Item 31), supra note 46, at 7.
48. 20 U.N. GAOR, C.1 (1422nd mtg.), supra note 47, at 429.
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with the COPUOS. They felt it would serve to promote the na-
tional interest without the burden of an overseeing international
organization.
B. 1967 Space Treaty
Early in the seventeenth session of the General Assembly
(1962), the U.S.S.R. submitted a draft proposal outlining the key
principles they believed should govern States in their exploration
and use of outer space.' 9 On June 16, 1966, during the twenty-first
session, the Soviet Union presented a letter to the Secretary-Gen-
eral on the governing of activities of States in outer space.60 A
draft treaty entitled Principles Governing the Activities of States
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies was prepared which led to the formulation of the
1967 Space Treaty.51
The 1967 Space Treaty and the Soviet pursuit of their legal
position marked the creation of major space law issues at the
United Nations. In four different sections of the Space Treaty the
phrase "peaceful uses" or "peaceful purposes" was highlighted.
The debate centered on the interpretation of that phrase.
The U.S.S.R. stated that "peaceful" in international law al-
ways meant nonmilitary, since the International Treaty of Antarc-
tica in 1959 and the Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weap-
ons, as well as United Nations Charter, define "peaceful" methods
of solving international disputes as those not connected with the
use of armed forces.5 The Soviets then changed their approach
from what appeared to be an interpretation of complete demilitari-
zation. They stated:
In our opinion the absence of a direct ban on certain kinds of
military activities should not serve as a basis for an automatic
transfer of those activities into the field of peaceful use of outer
space. Our viewpoint is that nonbanned military activities in
outer space constitute a separate category of space activities
aimed at utilizing outer space for peaceful purposes.
5 3
49. 17 U.N. GAOR, I Annexes (Agenda Item 27) 71, U.N. Doc. A/5181 (1962).
50. 21 U.N. GAOR, H Annexes (Agenda Items 30, 89 & 91) 15, 16, U.N. Doc. A/6431
(1966).
51. 1967 Space Treaty, opened for signature January 27, 1967, 410 U.N.T.S. 206.
52. "[s]eek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judi-
cial settlement. . . ." U.N. Charter Art. 33 Paral1.
53. G. ZHUKOV, On the Question of Interpretation of the Term "Peaceful Use of Outer
[Vol. 3108
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The Soviets stated that paragraph two of Article IV had already
demilitarized the moon and celestial bodies and that paragraph
one was an important step toward banning the use of all outer
space for military purposes.5 The U.S.S.R. distinguished between
activity where the military is employed and activity with a military
character, since paragraph two of Article IV specifically allowed
the use of military personnel for peaceful purposes.
5 5
By comparison, United States' position was based on the in-
terpretation of "peaceful use" as nonaggressive, rather than non-
military, activity. The United States had maintained this position
consistently ever since the beginning of the space era.56 According
to this definition "peaceful use" as used in the Space Treaty de-
noted nonaggressive activity in the traditional international legal
sense, where "aggressive" consisted of an attack on or undermining
another State's territorial sovereignty.5 The American delegation
went on to note that this interpretation was consistent with usage
in the United Nations Charter." This U.S. position limited the use
of outer space to nonaggressive activities and hence did not concur
with the Soviet partial demilitarization of space limited only to ce-
lestial bodies and the Moon. The American posture comported
with an earlier U.S. draft of Article I.5 The United States did
state that anything military was not ipso facto aggressive and war-
like, as the treaty itself in Article IV made this distinction clear.60
The U.S.S.R.'s position on nonappropriation of celestial bodies
or outer space was not limited to States but was to be obligatory
on private persons and corporations as well.61 "That treaties can
impose duties and liabilities upon individuals as well as States has
long been recognized." 68 However, the Soviet Union continued
Space" Contained in the Space Treaty, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH COLLOQUIUM ON
THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 37 (M. Schwartz ed. 1969).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 38.
56. 20 U.N. GAOR, First Committee (1422nd mtg.), supra note 47, at 429.
57. E. BROOKS, New Developments of Earth Satellite Law, in PROCEEDINGS OP THE
THIRTEENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 337, 344 (M. Schwartz ed. 1971).
58. 20 U.N. GAOR, First Committee (1422nd mtg.), supra note 47, at 429.
59. 21 U.N. GAOR, II Annexes (Agenda Items 30, 89 & 91) 7, U.N. Doc. A/6392 (1966).
60. E. GALLOWAY, Interpreting the Treaty on Outer Space, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
TENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 143, 145 (M. Schwartz ed. 1968).
61. G. ZHUKOV, Tendencies and Prospects of the Development of Space Law, in PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 275, 277 (M. Schwartz
ed. 1969).
62. W. BIsHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 462 (3rd ed. 1971).
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stating that this principle of nonappropriation did not create or
allow for the creation of an international administrative body gov-
erning outer space.
The United States emphasized that the principle of nonappro-
priation mandates that "[n]o State shall be permitted to say that a
portion of a celestial body was subject exclusively to its national
control."63 Reading from the text of its original wording the Soviet
Union argued that if a State developed the natural resources at a
definite lunar section the State should be able to preserve the right
to use this section exclusively. This followed, the Soviets con-
tended, by analogy from the situation in which a maritime State
has exclusive rights to its continental shelf for the purpose of ex-
ploiting natural resources.
If the way of analogy is chosen, we would consider more appropri-
ate in this case to compare the situation with the exploitation by
a maritime state of the natural wealths on and under the surface
of the continental shelf. It should be absolutely clear that if a
state proceeds to the mining of natural resources on a certain sec-
tion of the moon and, for that purpose, erects there all the re-
quired installations and structures, it would be necessary to rec-
ognize the right of that state to the exceptional use of that
section, like (sic) it has done with regard to the exceptional right
of a maritime state to use the natural resources of the continental
shelf."
While admitting this posture might infringe upon the principle of
equality of States, the Soviets were willing to digress slightly from
that legal principle in order to acquire a foreseeable economic ad-
vantage in the primary resource development rights in outer space.
Closely related to this issue of resource development was the
definitional question of celestial bodies. The Soviets stated that ce-
lestial bodies were the planets, natural satellites, asteroids and
large meteorites. Micrometeorites, smaller meteorites and comets
could not be celestial bodies from the viewpoint of international
regulation but should be included in the definition of "outer
space." 5 The United States preferred as broad a definition of "ce-
63. Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 22
U.N. GAOR (57th mtg. of the Subcomm.) 14, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 57 (1966).
64. G. ZHUKOV, The Problems of Legal Status of Scientific Research Stations on the
Moon, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 60, 61 (M.
Schwartz ed. 1968).
65. G. ZHUKOV, The Problems of the Definition of Outer Space, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
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lestial body" as possible, including even the micrometeorites.
Pursuing the original course of limiting applicable interna-
tional law to general principles, the U.S.S.R. put forth its proposal
that the exploration and use of outer sapce should comport with
fundamental principles of international law and basic principles of
the Charter. It listed prohibition of aggression, pacific settlement
of disputes, prohibition of war propaganda and disarmament as
the guiding principles." In keeping with its position, the U.S.S.R.
stated that "nonaggression" did not preclude the use of outer
space for military aims in accordance with Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter and permitted States to take measures in outer
space such as those outlined by Chapter VII of the Charter. 7
Pointing to Article II of the same document, the Soviets stated
that they would guide the States in the exclusive use of outer space
for peaceful purposes, not merely in the partial demilitarization ac-
complished by the treaty. However, the U.S.S.R. did not attempt
to draft a legal document which would articulate this goal."'
The Soviet Union was able to have its original Article X ac-
cepted in the Space Treaty. That article dealt with the granting of
observation opportunities upon request on the basis of equality.
The U.S.S.R. viewed the clause on the basis of equality as creating
the legal obligation comparable to a most favored nation clause.
While such a concept has been applied principally to economic re-
lations, the Soviets deemed it to be appropriate in the observation
context." The United States had agreed to allow a tracking system
to be built upon U.S. territory for the European Space Research
Organization. The Soviets felt that since a State party to the
Treaty was allowed to build a facility, another State party should
be accorded rights comparable to the most favored nation ap-
proach. The Soviets overlooked the fact that the clause "on the
basis of equality" does not establish a most favored nation obliga-
tion. Before arguing its applicability to this area it must first be
determined to have existed. The language of this clause does not
inherently create a most favored nation obligation.
The Soviets pointed with great enthusiasm to Article V which
TENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAw OF OUTER SPACE 271 (M. Schwartz ed. 1968).
66. G. ZHUKOV, Tendencies and Prospects of the Development of Space Law, supra
note 62, at 279.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 280.
69. INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW, supra note 2, at 107.
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provided astronauts with special international status entitling
them to assistance in cases of emergency or distress and a prompt
return to the launching State. The Soviets attempted to clarify the
clause by analogizing the duty of a seagoing ship's master under
the 1960 Convention on the Protection of Human Life: "[T]he
master should sail at full speed to help those in distress. .... ,,70
Always pragmatic, the Soviets realized that travel in space is lim-
ited and so only other astronauts already in space would be
charged with the ship captain's duty.
C. Convention on Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Activities
The U.S.S.R. had readily accepted Article VII of the Space
Treaty providing for international liability for damage caused by
space activities. They were able to point to Article VII as a major
achievement of the Space Treaty, yet were under no real obligation
since there were no means of enforcing the article's provisions.
The United States did present a proposal for a convention
concerning liability for damage caused by the launching of objects
into outer space.7 1 Draft Article II proposed that States were abso-
lutely liable for all damage caused by a space object. Absolute lia-
bility was a misnomer, however, in that if the State presenting the
claim had suffered damage as a result of willful or reckless conduct
or omission on its part, then the liability of the launching State
would to that extent be extinguished.72
The Soviets agreed with that position. Moreover, they agreed
to the application of the indemnification principle, i.e., where more
than one State was liable, that State could demand contribution
from the other States, and could join those States to the proceed-
ing if it felt they were jointly liable. Article III, Paragraph Four,
allowed for States conducting joint space programs to reach agree-
ments on their proportionate share of liability for their joint activi-
ties that would not only bind all the State parties to the agree-
ment, but the claimant State as well. The Soviets had also put this
70. G. ZHUKOV, International Cooperation on the Rescue of Astronauts, in PROCEED-
INGS OF THE ELEvENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 124 (M. Schwartz ed.
1968).
71. 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 21) 37, U.N. Doc. A/7621 (1969).
72. I. CsABAFi, Selected Chapters from Space Law in the Marketing/IV/Space Legal
Liability, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 110 (A.
Haley, M. Schwartz eds. 1965).
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proposal forward, which would allow the Soviets in all of their joint
projects an opportunity to bargain part of their liability away
through negotiation."
The United States in Article V sought to elaborate member
States' joint liability and the international organization contained
in Article VI of the Space Treaty. The United States went so far as
to make the international organization individually liable and the
sole source of payment for the claim for a period of one year. The
Soviets provided that an international organization could be held
liable for damage resulting from its space activities. This did not
represent a reversal of the Soviet position on the status of interna-
tional organizations; however, if the international organization
were held liable it would be jointly liable with its member States
for all financial liability.
74
The U.S.S.R. wanted the convention on liability limited to ac-
tions involving only two States, the State suffering the damage and
the State causing the damage. It wanted no outside interference
with the proceedings." More importantly, the Soviet theorists
wanted no individual to have standing to sue a State; only on a
State-to-State basis could relief be obtained.7
The fundamental differences of opinion lay in the measure-
ment of damages and in the settlement of claims procedure. Pref-
erence was accorded by the U.S.S.R. to giving extraterritorial effect
to the laws of damages and to governing persons injured by space
experiments." While they recognized that international law tran-
scended principles applicable within domestic Soviet society, the
U.S.S.R., Article 129 states: "[I]f the rules laid down by an inter-
national treaty or agreement to which the U.S.S.R. is a party are
different from those of Soviet civil law, the rules of the interna-
tional treaty or agreement shall apply."
'7
0
The Soviet Union also argued that States were sovereign
equals and as such were immune from the liability laws of other
States,7 9 yet they proposed that the launching State's law be im-
posed on the victim State for damage computation purposes. If
73. 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 21), supra note 72, at 77.
74. Id. at 73.
75. 24 U.N. GAOR, C. 1 (1719th mtg.) 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1719 (1969).
76. Id.
77. 24 U.N. GAOR, C.1 (1721st mtg.) 7, U.N. Doc. A/C.1I/PV. 1721 (1969).
78. Civil Law of the U.S.S.R., Article 129, which was cited by the Belgian delegates to
support their view that the Soviet position was inappropriate.
79. 24 U.N. GAOR, C.1, supra note 76, at 3.
19801
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Ann.
punitive damages were contemplated, then the Soviet reluctance to
submit to the victim's laws is understandable; the approach, how-
ever, was inadequate to reflect the true measure of the damages
suffered by the victim State.
By comparison, the American posture on measure and compu-
tation of damages was designed to restore the injured party to the
status quo. 0 It placed special emphasis on the payment of com-
pensation appropriate to the setting where the accident occurred.81
On balance, the American position would prevent a launching
State from claiming its own law was relevant, this perhaps result-
ing in a defeat of just elements of a claim put forth by the victim.
The U.S.S.R. not only argued strongly against this position, but
also against the creation of a claims commission as proposed in the
U.N. draft Article X. That article would create a commission with
competence to decide any dispute arising from the interpretation
or application of the liability convention. The commission deci-
sions would be binding on all parties. The Soviets were so strongly
opposed that they were willing to conclude the liability convention
without provisions ensuring payment to the victim and without
any type of judicial claims commission, thereby vitiating the re-
maining liability provisions.8 2
The United States maintained that there should be a means of
resolving disputes through the use of an impartial arbiter once a
year's negotiation had failed to produce a solution. An arbitration
panel should have the power to bind, not merely to recommend on
the basis of a majority. It should consist of three members auto-
matically constituted and not requiring deliberation with its resul-
tant delays.88
That proposal triggered a Soviet rejoinder which would not al-
low a claims commission to interfere with sovereign States. Such
interference was especially offensive since it was by an organization
that had binding authority and over whose makeup the U.S.S.R.
would have no control.
The compromise reached created a claims commission that
had powers of recommendation only. The U.S.S.R. accepted the
proposal relating to the applicable law, undoubtedly since the com-
mission could no longer bind the Soviets to its decision.
80. 25 U.N. GAOR, C.1 (1790th mtg.) 6, 7, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/1790 (1970).
81. 24 U.N. GAOR, C.1 (1718th mtg.) 14, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/1718 (1969).
82. 25 U.N. GAOR, C.1, supra note 81, at 11.
83. 24 U.N. GAOR, C.1, supra note 82, at 14.
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Launching States had every reason to heatedly debate the lia-
bility provisions. While general space technology has rapidly devel-
oped over the last few years, the art of minimizing damage caused
by reentering space objects has not kept pace. In 1979, for exam-
ple, U.S. space analysts predicted that a large Soviet rocket would
reenter somewhere around eastern Africa. It reentered over the
North Pacific." Launching States have yet to devise a method to
control the decaying orbits of their satellites or even to control
where they will reenter.
The limitations on space technology's ability to predict and
control could have drastic consequences. As more and more debris
is abandoned in space, the greater becomes the probability that
damage will be inflicted once the orbit has decayed.
The Soviets thus had strong motivations for creating as am-
biguous a convention as possible. The reality of total liability
borne by one State for an event clearly beyond its control was not
considered acceptable. At the final convention, the applicable law
in Article XII was interpreted as the U.S. sought: international
law, with the law of the claimant lex loci taken into account. The
measure of compensation in Article XII was the restoration of the
damaged State to status quo.8 Yet the final convention created a
claims commission which lacked any authority to make binding
decisions.
D. Registration of Space Objects Convention
Preceding the liability convention by approximately ten years,
General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI), December 20, 1961,
called for the registering of all launchings by any State conducting
space activities. Since it was a resolution, the launching States
could consider all information given as being voluntary. There
were no guidelines set for the standardization of the information
that was requested so that no common information of all States
was required.8 6 As the years progressed a piecemeal system of re-
gistration developed which, when summarized, revealed some coin-
cidence of information supplied by the two launching nations.
87
84. Wall Street Journal, May 16, 1979 at 1, col. 5.
85. 26 U.N. GAOR, Annex (Agenda Item 33) 5, at 7 U.N. Doc. A/8528 (1971).
86. G.A. Res. 1721, 16 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) 6, at 7, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1962).
87. G. ZHUKOV, Registration of the Launchings of Space Objects by the Secretary Gen-
eral of the United Nations, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWELFTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAw OF
OUTER SPACE 128 (M. Schwartz ed. 1969).
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Like the United States, the U.S.S.R. only reported objects
that were carried into earth orbit and beyond. This excluded bal-
listic missile test vehicles."8 Both nations were consistent in their
registration information, but it was on a voluntary basis. No
launching State could be required to acknowledge ownership under
the registration system.
The U.S.S.R. held that the primary purpose of national regis-
tration was the establishment of State jurisdiction, right of owner-
ship, and liability for damages. They stressed that this was the im-
portance of national registration and that the international
registration under General Assembly Resolution 1721 was volun-
tary exchange of information with no real legal consequences.8 9
The Soviets augmented their position with the registration clause
of Article VIII of the Space Treaty, stating that it referred only to
national registration and that it omitted any reference to interna-
tional registration.
The United States wanted an obligatory registration system in
the form of a treaty. 0 Its primary purpose would be the creation of
a juridical link between the launching State and the object itself.
This link would serve only to provide identification of the State
responsible for use with the liability convention."
The U.S.S.R. remained adamant.1 There were three probable
motivations underlying that position. The Soviets were fearful that
an obligatory international registration would invade the secrecy of
their military activities in space. They sought to avoid the burden
of responsibility for any damage under the liability convention.
They did not want to lose control of their national space activities
to an international organization. The first and second motivations
were obviously not publicly disclosed; however, substantial weight
could be given to the second in light of the Soviet actions on the
Cosmos 954 incident. Their third reason rested on the aforemen-
tioned Soviet view of the legal consequences that arise from the act
of registration. The Soviets felt that with the registration act went
the right of ownership. Hence the Soviets believed, as some West-
88. Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 29
U.N. GAOR (225th mtg. of the Subcomm.) U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR 225 (1974).
89. G. ZHUKOV, National Registration of Space Objects, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
TWELFTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OuTR SPACE 731 (M. Schwartz ed. 1969).
90. 27 U.N. GAOR, C.1, supra note 9, at 23.
91. Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 28
U.N. GAOR (193rd mtg.) U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 193 (1973).
92. 25 U.N. GAOR, C.1, supra note 81, at 11.
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ern writers had suggested, that an international organization would
be vested with all of the ownerships and responsibilities of space
activities and objects once in space. This notion was soundly re-
futed by Article VIII of the Space Treaty, yet the Soviets per-
sisted, declaring that "[s]pace objects should have nationality."3
Two compromises were necessary before the registration con-
vention could be completed: a deemphasis (1) on registration as a
legal act of the registration convention and (2) on the stated pur-
pose of providing a means of identifying space objects on reentry,
where that identification might give rise to a damages claim."
Thus, the registration of launchings under Resolution 1721 contin-
ued after the formation of a registration convention.
E. Satellite Surveillance
As stated earlier, the Soviet Union did not want their military
space activities to be disclosed. They sought to declare American
satellite surveillance of Soviet military activity an illegitimate use
of outer space. Such surveillance, the argument continued,
amounted to espionage, which is prohibited by the Preamble to the
United Nations Charter. 5 The language of the Preamble, however,
contains no such specific prohibitions and the argument therefore
appears unsound. The Soviet Union could nevertheless attempt to
construct its argument of prohibition by another route, that is, by
employing the Purposes and Principles of the Charter. Article 1,
Paragraph One, relates of course to the goal of maintaining inter-
national peace and security. By reading this stated purpose to-
gether with the requirement that Members refrain from threats or
force against another's territorial integrity, it is conceivably argu-
able that the Charter does indeed prohibit the surveillance
activity.e6
In order to reach this conclusion, however, "satellite surveil-
lance" must be construed as inconsistent with the maintenance of
93. G. ZHUKOV, supra note 91.
94. G.A. Res. 3235, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp (No. 31) 16, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
95. J. VERPLAESTE, Comments on the Report of Aldo Armando Cocca, in PRocEEDINGS
OF THE EIGHTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 149-151 (A. Haley, M. Schwartz
eds. 1965).
96. "The Purposes of the U.N. are: To maintain international peace and security.. 
Chapter I, Article 1(1) of the United Nations Charter. "All members shall refrain... from
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the U.N." Chapter T Article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter.
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peace and security. It is this construction which the United States
flatly rejects. The United States has of course recognized that the
maintenance of peace clauses, both in the Charter and in the Space
Treaty, are obligations. It does not consider military satellite sur-
veillance, in the frame of reference of the nuclear arms race, to be
inconsistent with those obligations. Its rationale continues: "[I]n
nuclear arms attack States must know of what weapons the other
side is possessed in order to defend themselves and in order to
properly negotiate general disarmament as required by Article Six
of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
'97
The Soviet Union had also attacked the American observa-
tions from space for espionage purposes as violations of their na-
tional sovereignty. Espionage committed in outer space, they ar-
gued, was every bit as blameworthy as that committed by the more
traditional means of aerial photography.'8 This was not an accu-
rate analogy, since aerial photography involves the invasion of the
territorial air space of the sovereign State, whereas under the
Space Treaty outer space is free for use, with no possibility of in-
fringement on territorial rights, since such rights do not exist in
space. The United States also found support in the Space Treaty
for its argument that satellite use for military observations was a
nonaggressive act. Hence, under the American interpretation satel-
lite surveillance is a peaceful use and is permissible under the
Space Treaty."
The U.S.S.R. also objected to satellite observation because it
provided much more detailed information than observation from
the high seas. The United States defended its posture on the
grounds that intelligence gathering from the territory of another
State by remote control was not in violation of general interna-
tional law. There is no positive rule of international law banning
such conduct, it concluded, whatever the municipal law of the ob-
served State might be.100 The United States did not say that the
rule of the Lotus case,101 that every Act of State not prohibited by
a positive rule of law was permitted, should be inflexibly applied to
all contexts. It referred rather to its earlier statement, that the
danger of nuclear warfare was a condition of such gravity as to
97. E. BRooKs, New Developments of Earth Satellite Law, supra note 58, at 340.
98. U.N. GAOR, C.1 (1289th mtg.) 213, at 216, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/SR. 1289 (1962).
99. Id. at 213.
100. E. BRooKs, New Developments of Earth Satellite Law, supra note 58, at 338.
101. P.C.I.J. Ser. A. No. 10, 1935.
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warrant the application of the Lotus rule. 02 The Soviet Union tac-
itly acknowledged the validity of this position when they called for
an international agreement that would prohibit outer space
espionage. 1°3
The U.S.S.R. stated that espionage conducted from outer
space was an aggressive act directed against their territory. They
went on to point out that the principle of nonaggression did not
preclude the use of outer space for striking back at an aggressor in
self-defense."3 ' The Soviets apparently were referring to their use
of "killer" satellites. These vehicles would approach a target (spy)
satellite and explode near it in order to destroy the spy satellite
with flying shrapnel or explosive force.105
In order to prevent use of such killer satellites the United
States and the Soviet Union entered a session of bilateral talks
during the closing rounds of the limitation negotiations (SALT II).
The United States' position was that killer satellites were illegal
and should be banned. ' " In line with the U.S. interpretation of the
term "peaceful uses," meaning nonaggressive uses, killer satellites
are an aggressive use of space and, therefore, violate the Space
Treaty. The U.S.S.R. took the opposite position, claiming that the
killer satellites were only used for self-defense and therefore allow-
able.'0 7 This claim was particularly weak since the Soviets had ex-
pressly avowed not to interfere with U.S. space reconnaissance ac-
tivities. The Soviets, therefore, expressly permitted this particular
"aggressive" activity.
F. Moon Treaty
The earth's natural satellite, the Moon, has also been a subject
of a Soviet treaty proposal.'es The Soviets sought a treaty that
would further the developmental process of codifying international
102. E. BROOKS, New Developments of Earth Satellite Law, supra note 58, at 338.
103. G. ZHUKOV, Nine Principles of Space Law, supra note 62, at 243.
104. Id.
105. The U.S.S.R. has conducted seventeen different exercises with the killer satellites
although all tests have been at a relatively low altitude of 120 miles, especially when com-
pared with the present altitude of military observation satellites of 22,500 miles. The U.S.
has not tested any killer satellite. Wilson, Soviets Ceased Antisatellite Testing 11 Months
Ago, Wash. Post, Apr. 21, 1979, at 71, col. 4.
106. Oberdorfer, U.S. and Soviets Will Discuss Ban of Killer Satellites, Wash. Post,
Apr. 10, 1979, at A4, col.1.
107. Time, May 21, 1979, at 23.
108. 26 U.N. GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Items 33, 92) 10 U.N. Doc. A/C.1/L.568 (1971).
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space law.109
The U.S.S.R. stated: "[Clertain provisions [of the U.S.S.R.
draft treaty on the Moon] deliberately repeat the principles out-
lined in the 1967 Treaty so as to finally put an end to arbitrary
interpretations encountered at times in relation to whether or not
a concrete provision of the Treaty applying to outer space also ap-
plies to the Moon."' 10 It is questionable whether the Soviet propo-
sal was needed in reference to the language of the Space Treaty.
The Soviets were again displaying their lack of faith in interna-
tional legal reasoning and their strategy of ensuring their interpre-
tation through the use of a treaty.
Taking into consideration the recent landings on Mars and
Venus, the United States suggested that the treaty should cover
celestial bodies generally,"' not be limited to the Moon only, since
no reasonable basis existed for distinguishing between them. It was
the U.S.S.R.'s position, however, that celestial bodies should be
omitted from the treaty until more information became known
about them." 2 In the final version of the treaty, the Soviet Union
was at least partially successful. Article XI (the key provision in
the treaty) designated that the Moon's natural resources consti-
tuted the "common heritage of mankind.""' The suggestion that
this "common heritage" principle be applicable to celestial bodies
was not incorporated in the final result."
4
This Soviet position on the key provision reflected the fact
that the main controversy surrounding the Moon Treaty centered
on the utilization of natural resources." 5 The Soviets stated that
the resources of the Moon should be the object of common use by
all States. They supported their position by analogy to the princi-
ple of nonappropriation on the high seas. It had been interpreted
there as having given "all States the opportunity of using the high
109. 26 U.N. GAOR, C.1, (1820th mtg.), supra note 12, at 5.
110. V. VASSILEVSKAYA, Legal Regulation of Activities on the Moon for the Cause of
Peace and Progress, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTEENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER
SPACE 178, 179 (M. Schwartz ed. 1973).
111. 33 U.N. GAOR Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space (288th mtg.) 4, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 288 (1978).
112. V. VASSILEVSKAYA, Introductory Report; Legal Problems of the Moon and Other
Planets, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTEENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 168
(M. Schwartz ed. 1974).
113. 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 37, U.N. Doc. A/34/20 (1979).
114. Id. at 7.
115. VASSILEVSKAYA, Legal Problems of the Exploration of the Moon and other Plan-
ets, supra note 113, at 170.
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seas for the exploitation of marine resources." 116 In this way, the
Soviets were able to accept the final Article XI ban on appropria-
tion of resources.
The United States also was reluctant to give up the right to
exploit lunar resources and those of celestial bodies. It had de-
ferred discussion of the proposed securing of resource benefits to a
future conference. Space Treaty principles of nonappropriation did
not address the question of natural resources in space.'17 The
United States did propose that the natural resources of the Moon
and other celestial bodies be considered as part of the common
heritage of mankind in order to meet the purpose of Space Treaty
Article One, "benefit of all countries."" 618 Article XI, Paragraph
One, did place the label "common heritage of mankind" on the lu-
nar resources.
The Soviets opposed the use of the concept of common heri-
tage stating that there was no need for dealing with the question of
resources."' The Soviets reasoned that the word "heritage" was
derived from the concept of inheritance. Inheritance was based on
the notion of previous ownership. In outer space there was no pre-
vious owner. Moreover, "heritage" was so bound up with owner-
ship that it had no value in space law.2 0 The Soviets stated that
the real motivation behind the proposal of common heritage was
that certain global authors aimed at a concept of erosion of State
frontiers and at establishing a world supranational organization
with plenary powers. According to the Soviets, this would lead to
an obvious infringement on the rights and interests of many States
and to the undermining of their sovereignty, since common inheri-
tance would give each and every State a right to a certain share of
the benefits gained by one State from the exploitation of these
resources.
1 2'
116. DEHANOZOV, Juridical Nature of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Ce-
lestial Bodies, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER
SPACE 200, 205 (M. Schwartz ed. 1975).
117. OKOLIE, Space Law and Energy Relationship with the Outer Space Station: A
Question of International Heritage of Mankind, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINETEENTH COL-
LOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OuTER SPACE 135, 144 (M. Schwartz ed. 1977).
118. Working Paper 12/Rev.1 27 U.N. GAOR, First Committee (1861st mtg.), C.1 supra
note 9, at 22.
119. 28 U.N. GAOR Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space (204th mtg.) 92, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.204 (1973).
120. DEHANOZOV, Juridical Nature of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Ce-
lestial Bodies, supra note 118, at 201.
121. Id. at 203.
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The Soviets, continuing their arguments, opposed not only
common heritage but res omnium communis as well. They rejected
res omnium communis as a notion transferred from Roman private
law into the field of international relations: "The attempts to gal-
vanize old ideas to squeeze new meaning into the Procrustean bed
of these terms cannot be successful . . . [the] term just set[s] the
soil for different and conflicting interpretation.
122
"Common heritage of mankind" concepts, first applied to the
seabed and subsoil beyond national jurisdiction, were untenable
from the Soviet legal point of view. A Soviet scholar stated:
It uses civil law categories in an arbitrary eclectic fashion without
any regard for established legal realities and brings to mind unde-
sirable associations (one is apt to recall the galvanized notion 'res
omnium communis'). At the same time ... it is so vague that it
is extremely difficult to conclude therefrom any concise regime. 1'8
Adherence to this concept would only give rise to differing in-
terpretations and result in undesirable frictions and conflicts be-
tween nations. Instead, the U.S.S.R. suggested a new concept, an
"international area for common use, ' 24 subject neither to State
sovereignty nor to appropriation by any other means. This doc-
trine derived from two fundamental principles, nonappropriation
and common use. "Common use" was defined as meaning that the
area concerned was open to exploration and use by all members of
the international community on a basis of equality and in accor-
dance with international law with free access to all its regions.15
The Soviets deemed the concept to be jus cogens since it con-
cerned the interests of all the international community.
The Soviet Union had embarked on a policy of attempting to
answer all possible ambiguities in the Space Treaty references to
the Moon with the conclusion of a treaty specifically applicable to
the Moon. In that effort they partially succeeded.
The Soviets grew accustomed to the notion that "common her-
itage of mankind" was ambiguous. They eventually recognized that
attribute as its strength. The Moon Treaty acknowledged as much
by requiring further action on the resources issue, and an interna-
122. R. V. DEKANozov, Relationships Between the Status of Outer Space and the Sta-
tus of Areas Withdrawn from State Sovereignty, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTEENTH COLLO-
QUIUM ON THE LAw OF OUTER SPACE 10 (M. Schwartz ed. 1973).
123. Id. at 10.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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tional committee will be set up for the exploitation of natural re-
sources on the moon. 26
The Soviets gained another very important advantage, specifi-
cally, the removal of the economic incentive for corporations which
cannot maximize profit when forced to share their gains for the
benefit of mankind. It is argued by the Soviets that the right to
exploit the resources nevertheless remains. If the treaty is signed
and ratified by the United States, the Soviets have accomplished a
long-sought objective of removing corporate participation in a ma-
jor area of space activity.
G. Geostationary Orbits
The Soviets, in keeping with their aforementioned policy, pro-
posed a draft agreement that defined the legal status of geostation-
ary orbits.12 7 The term "geostationary orbit" refers to a limited
number of orbital paths about the earth which allow a satellite to
remain situated above the same land mass throughout the course
of the earth's rotation. Maintenance of such an orbit can thereby
allow the uninterrupted use of that satellite over a particular land
mass.
The U.S.S.R. and the United States took a unified stance on
the prohibition of national appropriation of the geostationary or-
bit. The U.S.S.R. reasoned that there was no orbit without a satel-
lite. The jurisdiction of States over their space objects was guaran-
teed by space law and no claim could be made that the orbit of a
satellite belonged to another country. It was even more absurd to
claim sovereignty over a segment of an orbit since the orbit was
indivisible.1 26 The Soviets feared that if a State were permitted to
claim one orbit, then by logical extension, all claims over all orbits
would be allowable. This could not be done since the apogee of
some country's satellites extended tens of thousands of miles in
altitude. 129
Under the United States position, the geostationary orbit was
indistinguishable from other orbits. Its location was a function of
the total gravitational field and of the earth's rotation rate. More-
126. 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 40, U.N. Doc. A/34/20 (1979).
127. 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 29, U.N. Doc. A/32/20 (1977).
128. Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 32
U.N. GAOR (Corrigendum) 7, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 284-301/Corrigendum (1978).
129. Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Use" of Outer Space, 32
U.N. GAOR (297th mtg. of the Subcomm.) 10, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.297 (1978).
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over, the position continued, a satellite would not remain fixed in a
geostationary orbit due to the sun's gravitational pull and the
asymmetry of earth, Moon and planets. The conclusion was that
no relation could be said to exist between any particular country
and the satellite. Since, then, this special type of orbit was no dif-
ferent from any other orbit in terms of its functional relations to
earth, the satellite in geostationary orbit was governed by Article
Two of the Space Treaty. This article denies any domestic jurisdic-
tion or claim of ownership. In view of the fact that orbits can at-
tain altitudes of 22,000 miles, the United States added, the grant-
ing of orbits as a type of limited resource to any particular country
would run counter to the uses of space based on equality, as pro-
vided by the Space Treaty.2 0 The reasoning concluded by noting
that use of a favorable orbit for a legitimate activity could not be
classified as a national appropriation which was prohibited by the
Space Treaty.131 The Soviet proposal basically concurred in this
reasoning.
H. Space Shuttle
Another interesting implementation of the Soviet interna-
tional legal theory which created controversy was their adoption of
a position which would, in effect, put the United States' Space
Shuttle out of operation.
The Space Shuttle vehicle was to be launched from facilities
located on land with a flight path over open water. Its configura-
tion would consist of a flight orbiter boosted into earth by a solid
fuel booster which was to be jettisoned over international waters
and then retrieved. The shuttle would progress into the earth's or-
bit and remain there until its reentry into earth's atmosphere. As
it began its descent, the shuttle would be capable of a slight degree
of aerodynamic flight in correcting its path of descent." 2
Before the advent of this shuttle, the U.S.S.R. recognized that
there was a grey area concerning Article Eight of the Space Treaty.
This article conferred jurisdiction of the launching State on the
130. Id. at 3, 4.
131. GOEDHIUS, Some Legal Aspects of the Use of Communication Satellites, in PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 53, 56 (M.
Schwartz ed. 1974).
132. TAMM, Advent of the Space Shuttle in Earth Resources Investigation, in PRo.
CEEDINGS OF THE FIFTEENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 45 (M. Schwartz ed.
1972).
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space object at all points in flight in outer space. However, the
question of who had jurisdiction over the space object when it
passed through the air space of other States on reentry remained
unanswered. The U.S.S.R. stated that there were two choices: ap-
ply jurisdiction of the State whose air space was invaded for the
few seconds of transgression, or retain jurisdiction of the launching
State with permission of the State to fly in its air space. The
U.S.S.R. recommended that because of the short time interval the
latter choice was the preferable means of handling the problem."8'
Although this was a jurisdictional question, the Soviet Union was
impliedly taking the position that a county's air space was being
invaded, though only momentarily. The question seemed of little
importance at that time because no country protested the "inva-
sion" of its air space and it appeared to be an academic concern
which would ultimately be settled by customary international law.
With the advent of the shuttle the question became important
to the Soviet Union, which had no comparable shuttle program.
The U.S.S.R. stated that important stages of flight, descent and
landing took place at comparatively low altitude in the superjacent
space of the earth: "Undoubtedly these stages of the spacecraft as
well as orbital or interplanetary motion represent space activities
and cannot be considered separately. The activities which are car-
ried out by spacecraft are space activities all the way through re-
gardless of the altitude and location.""" The Soviets then drew the
conclusion that a flight in superjacent space of a foreign State was
not a violation of international law because the Space Treaty con-
firmed, on a contractual basis, the general principle of freedom of
space activities when lawfully carried out under international law.
The Soviets added that this freedom of space activities was limited
by the controlling State's obligation to act in such a way that the
lawful rights and interests of other States were not violated.138
The Soviets were referring to the prohibition against violating
the right of subjacent States to regulate their economic, political
and military interests within their territory. These were guaran-
teed as stemming from the lex generalis of Sovereignty of States
principle of international law. Freedom of outer space was a lex
133. Nine Principles of Space Law, supra note 62, at 99.
134. EMIN, Spaceflight and the Problem of Vertical Limit of State Sovereignty, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTEENTH CouqiOQUmU ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 202 (M.
Schwartz ed. 1972).
135. Id. at 203.
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generalis of space law, but was a lex specialis of general interna-
tional law. Freedom of outer space, therefore, could not serve as a
pretext for a violation of the sovereign rights of a State.18s The
Soviets consistently held that space vehicles could not transgress
the air space of a foreign State, even while in the process of con-
ducting a space activity.
The United States was still faced with the violation of sover-
eign air space by use of the space and might be forced to attempt a
reentry solely over the high seas or transgressing air space with or
without permission of the subjacent States. The last alternative
was not without legal justification, for the United States could con-
tend that the altitude at which its shuttle flies over the foreign
country was still considered outer space and hence fell under the
Space Treaty freedom of space activities clause.
L Definition of Outer Space
Ever since the beginning of space law, nations have wrestled
with the question of how to delimit outer space from air space.
Until 1979, the U.S.S.R. had assumed the posture that definitions
of outer space which created a boundary between air space and
outer space were premature; the scientific and technical criteria
which would permit a definition of outer space were nonexistent.
137
The defining of outer space had a crucial role in the denucleariza-
tion aspect of peaceful coexistence, since the stationing of nuclear
weapons in outer space was banned by Article Four of the Space
Treaty. The resolution of the boundary was important in deciding
the balance of the freedom of uses of outer space clause and the
sovereign rights of the subjacent State over its air space: "The
creation of the delimitation of outer space would create a specific
legal regime. Such a zone would limit freedom of outer space activ-
ities and therefore contradict the provisions of the Space
Treaty."1  In keeping with their overall strategy, the Soviets
stated a defined limit "can be created only through an interna-
tional agreement, by a conclusion of an appropriate multilateral
agreement." 39
136. VERESHCHErIN, Perspectives of the Uses of Outer Space for Applied Purposes and
State Sovereignty, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NI rEENm COLLOQuIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER
SPACE 103, 104 (M. Schwartz ed. 1977).
137. INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW, supra note 2, at 28.
138. U.N. Press Release, OS/852 April 5, 1978.
139. Basic Stages and Immediate Prospects of the Development of OVTA Space Law,
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The United States did not want a specific definition of an air
space limit until it was more scientifically and legally advanced.""0
That position would allow the United States to conduct its Space
Shuttle flights over a foreign country without its permission on the
basis that its travel was entirely in outer space since no limit was
prescribed.
That precise advantage of the U.S., combined with the Soviet
desire to perpetuate the conflict with the West, was the key moti-
vation behind the 1979 Soviet proposal. The Soviets, having no
Space Shuttle program themselves and having a sufficiently large
land mass to enable them to conduct their space activities without
traversing any foreign air space, proposed a delimitation of 100-110
kilometers above sea level for an air space zone."' This also had
the corollary effect of placing the Soviets as the initiator of a solu-
tion to a problem that was increasingly in controversy while the
United States procrastinated on the issue. According to the
Soviets, their proposal was temporary and would lead to a more
permanent agreement.
J. Satellite Communications
The chief Soviet concern in the area of satellite communica-
tions was the possibility of direct television broadcasting via satel-
lite.""2 The U.S.S.R. wanted a speedy solution to legal problems
involving direct broadcasts. The motivation was apparently a belief
that a television picture would be far more understandable by the
public and would have a much greater effect than any other
medium.""
The U.S.S.R. posited that direct broadcasts via satellite con-
stituted a space activity. " Hence direct television broadcasts fell
under Article Nine of the Space Treaty requiring that States "con-
duct their activities with due regard to the corresponding interests
supra note 29, at 323.
140. U.N. Press Release, USUN-27 (79) March 15, 1979.
141. Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 34
U.N. GAOR (303rd mtg.) 4, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 303 (1979).
142. Television broadcasting by satellite at present requires a ground receiving station
to transmit to televisions at home. The Soviets are not fearful of this type of transmission
since censorship is possible at the receiving station. They are concerned with future broad-
casting directly to the television set via satellite.
143. INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW, supra note 2, at 186.
144. Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 29
U.N. GAOR (218th mtg.) 61, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 218 (1974).
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of all other States parties to the Treaty.""" The Soviets argued
that Article Nine implied that a prior agreement between the
States concerned should be reached before satellite communication
with a State's territory occurred, since respect for State sover-
eignty was the cornerstone of international law." 6 The U.S.S.R.
added that States had the right to protect their interests. The
Soviets stated that all direct broadcasting without prior consent of
the country to whose territory the broadcasts were made was a vio-
lation of international law."
7
The United States agreed that direct broadcasting via satel-
lites was a space activity but argued that Article Nine of the Space
Treaty applied only to harmful contamination of the space or
earth environment." s
The Soviets refined their argument, stating that Article Nine
of the Space Treaty contained two principles: first, the obligation
of States to conduct activities with due regard to the correspond-
ing interest of all other parties; second, the obligation of State par-
ties to pursue studies and conduct exploration of outer space so as
to avoid its harmful contamination. The first was part of the lex
generalis of space law, whereas the second was lex specialis. The
provision of Article Nine regarding the international consultations
applied to the two aforementioned principles.
4"9
The U.S.S.R. also attempted to relate direct broadcasts to
other articles of the Space Treaty. It cited the noble aims of Arti-
cles One and Three which could be fulfilled only on the basis of a
strict international legal order. s0 This reading of the Space Treaty
rested heavily on the Soviet theory of international law and lightly
on any legal construction of those articles.
Yet another avenue the U.S.S.R. had sought for regulation of
direct broadcasts was the Space Treaty's Preamble. References
were made therein to General Assembly Resolution 110 (II). This
resolution condemned propaganda which aimed at or was capable
145. Id.
146. 24 U.N. GAOR, C.1 (1719th mtg.) 3, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1719 (1969).
147. Id.
148. 22 U.N. GAOR, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (66th mtg.) 12,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105fPV. 66 (1969).
149. KOLossov, Legal Consequence of "Spill-over" Resulting from Satellite Direct
Broadcasting, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FirNTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUrTE SPACE
73 (M. Schwartz ed. 1972).
150. Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 32
U.N. GAOR (283rd mtg.) 9, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 283 (1977).
128 [Vol. 3
Soviet Approach to Space Law
of creating or increasing threats to peace, violations of the peace or
acts of aggression. The Soviets seized upon this resolution and ar-
gued that all such "propaganda plus" programs undermining the
basis of local civilization, culture, home life, traditions and lan-
guage should be banned."'1 The wide scope of the ban did not nec-
essarily dictate the full implementation of it. Yet the Soviets' pro-
posed use of the ban became apparent with one of their statements
on potential broadcasts: "[C]ommercial television programs or ad-
vertisement intended for a population of another country and
transmitted via direct broadcast satellites may cause economic
damage in this country."' 52
Another preeminent issue for the Soviet Union regarding di-
rect broadcasting by satellite was the stated American position on
freedom of information. The U.S. based its legal justification for
free flow of information on Article Nineteen of the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights, which guaranteed all the right to "seek,
receive and impart information and ideas through any media re-
gardless of frontiers."'16 The United States contended that an
open market place of ideas and information was essential to the
well-being of the international community and that a free flow of
information would injure no nation.'" Freedom of information
meant there was a right to communicate one's thoughts freely, not
an absolute right, but one balanced between controls justified by
reason and experience and those controls not justified. 55 The
United States further stated that international comity would pre-
vent international direct broadcasts via satellite into a country not
wanting it and that strict provisions set up by the International
Telecommunications Union would regulate direct broadcasts as
well. 56 The United States cited a logistical reason for denying the
concept of prior consent. The broadcast beam usually covered
151. ZHUKOV, International Law Problems of Direct Television Broadcasts System, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTEENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 115, 117 (M.
Schwartz ed. 1976).
152. DUAKOV, Some International Legal Issues on the Direct Television Broadcasts
System, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTEENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 164
(M. Schwartz ed. 1971).
153. Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 34
U.N. GAOR (304th mtg.) 8, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 304 (1979).
154. RUDDY, The Freedom of Information and Direct Broadcasts System, in PROCEED-
INGS OF THE SIXTEENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 82 (M. Schwartz ed. 1973).
155. Id. at 83.
156. Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
supra note 155.
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more than one State. If one State said "no," then a substantial.
number of States would be prohibited from receiving the broad-
cast. Such a result would defeat the goal of increased exchanges of
contacts and interaction between States.
157
Concluding that the necessity of obtaining prior consent would
impose blanket controls on all ideas at the source, the Americans
noted that absolute adherence to national sovereignty must some-
times be modified by principles of international cooperation and
mutual understanding. 
58
In marked contrast, the U.S.S.R. maintained that dissemina-
tion of information to each State could not be placed on the same
footing as the fundamental principle of State sovereignty, "some-
thing no honorable, international jurists would venture to de-
fend." 159 The Soviets pointed out that "recognition of the princi-
ples of freedom of information in international relations would
mean a sacrifice of State sovereignty and attempts to prove the
existence of that principle could not be viewed as anything other
than an attempt to interfere in the domestic affairs of sovereign
States.' 60
In addition, the Soviets were concerned with what they viewed
as a United States attempt to use direct broadcasts as a lever to
impose an alien and unacceptable way of life upon less developed
countries. "The U.S.S.R. wanted freedom of information too but it
wanted true information and was not in favor of the so-called free
information such as the Voice of America."'16 The Soviets stated
that the U.S. sought a monopoly in direct television broadcasting
so as to:
spread over the whole world everything that private American
broadcasting companies hold dear, no matter what the national
characteristic of each country is, no matter what the foundation
of their civilizations, their culture, their history of moral values.
Who is going to be at the source of their flow of information, re-
sponsible government officials or irresponsible private firms and
companies which are ready to stoop to anything for profit? Any
filthy flow of information would be disseminated by them.
157. 29 U.N. GAOR, C.1 (1990th mtg.) 7, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV. 1990 (1974).
158. Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 29
U.N. GAOR (219th mtg.) 75, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 219 (1974).
159. 27 U.N. GAOR, C.1 (1861st mtg.) 22, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/1871 (1972).
160. Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 30
U.N. GAOR (239th mtg.) 115, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 239 (1975).
161. 27 U.N. GAOR, C.1, supra note 9, at 31.
[Vol. 3
Soviet Approach to Space Law
We do not call that kind of flow freedom of information. Freedom
of information for what.'s
The Soviet government had proposed a draft convention on
principles governing the use of artificial earth satellites for direct
television broadcasting.' 6s The Soviets showed considerable lack of
faith in the solidarity of their legal arguments and tried to resolve
the issues at the negotiation table.The United States made a proposal as well. 6 ' The U.S.S.R.
said that since all the delegates to the COPUOS took part in the
debate of the U.S.S.R.'s proposal, it was a timely one and a treaty
would be the way to achieve control over this area of international
activity." The Soviets misread the U.S. stance, which was not
that it was premature to discuss but that it was premature to write
a formal treaty on a subject which was still in the experimental
stage.
The Soviets refused to permit the insertion of the freedom of
information clause because they could link the interpretation of
that clause to a freedom of information convention proposal that
had been worked on for twenty years without success. The Soviets,
adding to their resounding disapproval of the clause, stated: "[w]e
not only understand but we also see the horrible, tragic conse-
quences and abuses bordering on anarchy.1 6"
The main Soviet legal foundation was built upon the principle
of sovereignty and designed by their legal theory of codifying inter-
national space law through the use of treaties. The Soviet treaty
was attempting censorship at the source. For U.S.-based broad-
casts this would be in conflict with the First Amendment which
provides in part, "Congress shall make no law abridging the free-
dom of speech or of the press. . . ." This has consistently been
interpreted as applying to all branches of the national govern-
ment. 67 Although no treaty has been declared unconstitutional,
treaties are subject to constitutional limitations.1" The President,
therefore, could not reach an executive agreement with the Soviets
162. 27 U.N. GAOR, C.1, supra note 8, at 46.
163. 27 U.N. GAOR, 2 Annexes (Agenda Item 28) 3, 4, U.N. Doc. A/8771 (1972).
164. GALLOWAY, DIRCT BROADCAST SATELLrIES, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH
COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 35 (M. Schwartz ed. 1974).
165. 27 U.N. GAOR, C.1 (1869th mtg.) 57, U.N. Cod. A/C.1/PV. 1869 (1972).
166. Id.
167. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, at 716 (1970).
168. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, at 328 (1937).
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for censorship in the U.S. Of course, the First Amendment has no
extraterritorial effect for prohibiting foreign States from censoring
broadcasts in their countries.1 9
It appeared that consultations between States would provide
the means for conducting direct broadcasts. Even the consultations
are a critical area of controversy. The U.S.S.R. and the U.S. have
both agreed to notify the reception area in advance of the inten-
tion to broadcast."10 The consultations requirement and its effect
have not been worked out. The U.S.S.R. clearly wants no direct
broadcasts until prior consent of the receiving country is granted.
The U.S. agreed to enter into consultations concerning any
matter of the broadcast system each time another State requested
such consultation. This was thought by the United States to be a
considerable obligation. The United States also stated that there
would be a good faith requirement to enter into the consultations
promptly and consider carefully the possibilities for resolving any
difficulties that might arise.71 There was not any requirement that
the broadcasts should not go on if an agreement were not reached.
So the argument of free flow of information versus State sover-
eignty and noninterference is still being conducted.
The motivation for the Soviet position is at the very root of
the functioning of the governmental apparatus. Free flow of infor-
mation would fatally disrupt a society whose institutions were
designed to achieve all-encompassing control over the human and
material resources which must be readily allocated in the produc-
tion process outlined by the State. 2 The understanding of Soviet
international law comes with the recognition that it is closely al-
igned to the political purposes and goals espoused by the State.
In some circumstances national government have [sic] de-
cided that absolute control on all new media, mass communica-
tion facilities, and even the ingress of persons are [sic] essential.
In certain countries today the strictest regimes of censorship and
control of news and traffic flow are maintained. It would not be
politically convenient for such nations to participate in an [sic]
unified global system of Satellite Communications, unless distri-
bution of all communication could be controlled through earth
169. Id.
170. 30 U.N. GAOR, C.1 (2049th mtg.) 24, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV. 2049 (1975).
171. Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
supra note 112, at 5, 6.
172. RAMUNDO, THE SovIET LEGAL SYSTEM "A PRIMER" (1971).
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stations, through which various forms of communication would be
required to pass. In this manner censorship and national sover-
eignty could be perpetuated. The potentials of direct radio and
television broadcasting, however, may instill in the minds of some
governmental leaders fear of lack of censorship control. Potential
propaganda and ideological or idealive [sic] broadcasts challeng-
ing certain forms of government or regimes or social order and
arguing in favor of competing systems and social orders may well
prove too distasteful and undesirable to some nations to be
allowable.' 78
K. Remote Sensing
Another satellite use that had prompted Soviet concern was
the remote sensing of earth resources. Satellites take high resolu-
tion pictures of the earth from a perspective not available to earth-
bound technicians. These photographs prove useful in the fields of
meteorology, geology, energy, agroeconomics, and ecology or envi-
ronmental studies, as well as the military.17 4 The U.S.S.R. wanted
to control the dissemination of the data received by the U.S. from
its remote sensing satellite system."' The Soviets did not seek a
ban of all data such as global scale sensing. They proposed rather a
ban on photographs with a resolution of fifty meters or less, which,
the U.S.S.R. contended, provided valuable information about a
State's natural resources.1' The State sovereignty principle in-
cluded the right of the State to exercise exclusive and uncondi-
tional control over its natural resources and the information per-
taining thereto. Hence there could be no dissemination of that
information without prior consent of that State on the basis of
equality.177 The Soviets charged that the economic interests of the
State were at stake, since other States and multinational corpora-
tions, through superior technology in interpreting the data, would
learn more than the "sensed" State itself. This would result in un-
equal bargaining positions in subsequent negotiations for the ex-
173. HALEY, Communications in Space, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH COLLOQUIUM ON
THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 156 (A. Haley, M. Schwartz eds. 1965).
174. STANLEY FOUNDATION, COOPERATION OR CONFRONTATION IN OUTER SPACE, 13th Con-
ference on the U.N. of the Next Decade 11 (1978).
175. Hereinafter cited as LANDSAT.
176. ZHUKOV, International Law Problems Related to the Exploration of Earth Re-
sources from Outer Space, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINETEENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF
OUTER SPACE 108, 110 (M. Schwartz ed. 1965).
177. 32 U.N. GAOR, C.1 (43rd mtg.) 67, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/32/PV. 43 (1977).
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ploitation of that State's natural resources.""8
Such data could also reveal a Soviet crop failure or loss of pro-
duction which, of course, if publicized could prove a potential blow
to Soviet world prestige. This provided no legal justification and it
was not thought that the Soviets could be exploited. The Soviets
later revealed what was probably their key motivation aside from
the loss of prestige. The U.S.S.R. stated that the use of high reso-
lution photographs would be used to disclose the defense potential
of the "sensed" State.117 The possibility of the People's Republic
of China's acquisition of such information about the Soviet Union
was the key factor in the Soviet protests.180
Paralleling their course of action in the direct broadcasting
controversy, the Soviet Union created their own remote sensing
data dissemination, program for the international community,
called Inter Cosmos. This would serve as a working model of the
Soviet proposal by releasing data only to those countries that had
entered into an agreement with the Soviet Union and releasing
only those data which could be used for a practical purpose. 81
Paralleling its stance on direct television broadcasting, the
United States adamantly refused to alter its policy on free dissemi-
nation of the data. The United States based its approach on Arti-
cle Eleven of the Space Treaty, which provides that States inform
the public to the greatest extent feasible and practicable of the na-
ture, conduct, locations and results of such activities.1 82 This posi-
tion refuted any requirement of advance consent. Because it was
technologically and economically infeasible to separate the images
along lines of political borders, the United States noted that failure
to acquire all of the required consensual agreements could result in
denial of the data to entire regions. This would defeat the whole
purpose of using satellites to study the earth on a global scale.'L"
The United States stated that there had been no instance of
economic exploitation after over one hundred countries had re-
178. VERESHOHRTN, Perspectives of the Uses of Outer Space, supra note 138, at 105.
179. Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
supra note 143, at 4.
180. A U.S. delegate to Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space had so noted.
181. Mongolia, Morocco and Angola have signed such agreements. U.N. Press Release,
0S/221 March 31, 1978.
182. Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
supra note 152, at 8.
183. U.N. GAOR, C.1, supra note 159, at 12.
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ceived the data.184 It also pointed out that the Space Treaty's goal
of maintaining a system of space use and exploration for benefit of
all on the basis of equality would be defeated if States were unable
to share data freely, and that irregular and hence discriminatory
dissemination would prove inevitable.
185
Continued hostility to the American program and position on
the part of the Soviet Union seems probable. The U.S. plans to
develop remote sensing satellites that provide even greater resolu-
tion approaching the ten to twenty meter range. ' 86 Of potentially
greater Soviet concern was the statement of National Aeronautics
Space Agency head Robert Frosch to the U.S. Congress regarding
the future of the LANDSAT program: "A Comsat-type picture-
satellite company is a very strong possible contender. 1 87
CONCLUSION
It is evident that the Soviet international space law approach
is inseparably bound to the political policies of the Soviet Union.
An understanding of the Soviet domestic political scene would per-
haps serve as a useful guide to their international legal theories.
Nevertheless there 'are consistent legal positions that the U.S.S.R.
has strictly adhered to in their approaches to questions of inter-
national space law.
The central feature and probable explanation for the consis-
tency is the placement of the Soviet national interest above all
other considerations. The Soviet legal arguments that were not re-
peated were withdrawn because they could no longer serve the So-
viet interest, not because they were no longer legally relevant.
Above all other goals in that area, the Soviet Union seeks to
codify space law. The negotiations and compromises allow the So-
viets the desired flexibility necessary to mold general international
principles and theory to meet their view of international order.
The use of these negotiations bolsters the Soviet legal reasoning
which is politically based rather than resting on classic inter-
national legal theory. The international conventions permit the
184. U.N. Press Release, OS/215 March 16, 1978.
185. A/C.1I/PV. 1990 29 U.N. GAOR, C.1, supra note 159, at 12.
186. A proposed Landsat D scheduled for a 1981 launching will obtain pictures of ob-
jects 30 meters across compared with present 80 meter resolution. In the mid-1980's a Stere-
osat will take three-dimensional images and have a sharper resolution, between 10-20 me-
ters. Wall Street Journal, April 5, 1979, at 46, col. 1.
187. Id.
19801
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Ann.
achievement of results that are politically founded, thereby remov-
ing obstacles and challenges to the Soviet approach that could not
be successfully hurdled through a strictly legal argument. The
treaties sought by the Soviets to solve a problem at the present
time serve future Soviet interests as well.
The Soviet concentration on the inviolability of the principle
of State sovereignty and its commensurate rights will, of course,
continue despite the plethora of Soviet pleas for international co-
operation. In light of its steadfast loyalty to the State Sovereignty
principle, the U.S.S.R. is not likely to accord international organi-
zations a significant degree of responsibility. Opportunities for ex-
tensive cooperation in space activities are shunned by the Soviets
and separate but duplicate programs are used to avoid extensive
alignment with the West.
The Soviet view of private corporations as the reckless capital-
istic bourgeoisie is deeply rooted in their ideological tenets and is
unlikely to be muted.. The criticism of those corporations also
serves as an'ideological rallying cry for the Soviet propaganda ef-
fort connected with peaceful coexistence policy.
The U.S.S.R. expansion of space law will also continue in se-
lected dreas, especially those where regulation will either thwart
another country's space technological advantage or protect a Soviet
space activity.
International space law is developing at an extremely fast
pace. In the context of the Soviet interest in managing that devel-
opment, a vital requisite to the understanding of the direction
space law is taking is the recognition and comprehension of the
Soviet attitude toward the evolution of this branch of international
law.
Mark Robson
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